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CASES NOTED
in the absence of sufficient interests, a "suit limiting clause" can not be
characterized as being so repugnant to a state's vital interests as to justify
its being disregarded on the basis of public policy. What factors will be
legally sufficient to balance the demands of due process against the public
policy of the forum have not yet been decided in this area, and will be
subject to final determination through review by the United States
Supreme Court.23
REUBEN M. SCHNEIDER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH WITHOUT
WARRANT UNDER STATE POLICE POWER
The defendant's refusal to permit entry to the Commisioner of
Health, who acted after finding a pile of rat-infested debris on defendant's
property, resulted in a fine under the Baltimore City Code,' which permits
daylight demands for entry without warrant by the Commissioner. Held:
a penalty imposed for resisting the inspection of a health official, without
warrant, prompted by a danger to the public health, does not violate due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Frank v. State of Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
The authorization of searches by an administrative officer without
warrant, under the state police power, has undergone a progressive develop-
ment in the law. It is acknowledged that the guaranty of the fourth
amcndment to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, does
not apply directly to state actions. 2 However, that security is "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, and as such, enforceable against the
states through the Due Process Clause." Generally, this limitation has
been construed to allow reasonable searches by implications and has not
been held enforceable against the unlawful acts of individuals in which
the government has no part." A search without a warrant demands
23. Sun. Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,
361 U.S. 874 (1959).
1. BALTIMORF, ND., HEALTH COnE art. 12, §120 (1950): "Whenever the Com-
missioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar
or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the daytime, and if the owner or occupier
shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit
and pay for every such refusal the sun of Twenty Dollars."
2. \Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383 (1914); National Safe Deposit Co.
v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1896).
3, Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
4. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1914); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1946); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
5. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); United States v. Jordan, 79 F. Supp. '11 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
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exceptional circumstances,0 and if officers are not responding to an
emergency or making a search incident to a lawful arrest,7 "there must
be compelling reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant.",, Most
of these instances have occurred in the area of criminal prosecutions,
but the allowance of warrantless searches in administrative areas of the
police power is a development seemingly based on the historical antecedents
of the fourth amendment? Only six cases, excluding the instant case,
have considered this point. In a 1936 New Hampshire case,' a statute
empowering the Commissioner of Agriculture to search barns,"1 without
a warrant, for signs of infected domestic animals, was upheld as not
violative of due process of law. Here the court weighed public necessity
under the police power "against the seriousness of the restriction of
private right sought to be imposed,"' 2 in order to determine the statute's
reasonableness. A South Carolina nmunicipal ordinance'3 provided for
alteration, repair, or destruction of substandard dwellings and empowered
the Rehabilitation Director to make inspections thereof without a warrant,
in order to determine fitness for human habitation. \V"hen construed by
the South' Carolina Supreme Court in Richards v. City of Columbia,4
the statute was upheld as a constitutional exercise of the police power.
While the question of an unreasonable search was not directly presented
to the court,' it noted that "there is doubt whether such an entrance
would come within the constitutional guaranties against unreasonable
searches.' 6 The same section of the Baltimore Code under consideration
in the instant case,' 7 was considered in the 1956 decision of Givner v.
State of Maryland. The court considered the daylight search a reasonable
one, as allowed by the constitution, and held that "municipalities and
6. Johnson v. United States, 333 US. 10 (1948).
7. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1946); United States v. Lee, 274
U.S. 559 (1927); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mattews v. Correa,
135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943); Parks v. nited States, 76 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1935).
8. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
9. Viewing the Fourth Amendment in its historical background, it was said that:
"The constitutional provision in question does not apply to reasonable rules and regu-
lations adopted in the exercise of the police powers for the protection of the public
health, morals and welfare." CoRssNEUs, StAncirns AND SFZrRrS § 35 (2d ed. 1930).
10. Dedriek v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 Atl. 595 (1936), appeal dismissed, 299
U.S. 506 (1936).
11. N. 11, uainmc LAWS cis. 187, § 29 (1926).
12. Dedrick v. Smith, 88 N,1. 63, 184 Atl. 595 (1936), appeal disiuissed, 299
U.S. 506 (1936).
13. COLUnIA, S.C., CODE § 36-501 (1952). This provides for the Rehabilitation
Director to "enter upon premises for the purpose of making examinations, provided that
such entries shall be made in suchi manner as to cause the least possible inconvenience
to the persons in possession."
14. 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
15. The action was an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the ordinance
and therefore no entrance or search of any premises had been made by the Director
over the objection of an occupant.
16. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 556, 88 S.E.2d 683, 692 (1955).
17. BLTIMoaR, Mn., HJEALTHs CorDE. art. 12, § 120 (1950). This allowed the
Commissioner of Health to make a "demand for entry therein in the daytime."
18. 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
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other governing agencies may lawfully provide for general routine inspec-
tions at reasonable hours without search warrants."' 91 In State ex rel.
Eaton v. Price,20 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a search, under a
municipal inspection ordinance, 21 did not violate the provisions of the
fourth or fourteenth amendments since, "the right of a home owner to
the inviolability of his 'castle' should be subordinate to the general health
and safety of the community where he lives." 22
Only two cases have denied the power to make such administrative
searches without a warrant. In the 1949 case of Little v. District of
Columbia,2 3 a homeowner was convicted for failure to allow an inspection,
by the Health Commissioner, of her home, as provided for under the
laws of the District of Columbia.24 The United States Court 'of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the conviction, 25
holding that the defendant was within her fourth amendment rights in
refusing to allow such an inspection without a warrant. Judge Holtzoff
wrote a vigorous dissent based on the non-applicability of the fourth
amendment to areas outside of criminal and penal actions, therefore not
affecting "inspections conducted in the course of the administration of
statutes and regulations intended to promote public health or public
safety."28 Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court,27 the decision
was affirmed on other grounds, 28 the court refusing as has been its custom,29
to discuss the constitutional issue when it can be avoided. However,
Justices Burton and Reed dissented, stating that "the duties which the
inspector was seeking to perform were of such a reasonable, general,
routine, accepted and important character, in the protection of the public
health and safety, that they were being performed lawfully without such
a search warrant as is required by the Fourth Amendment."8 The only
19. Id. at 505, 124 A.2d at 775.
20. 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 N.E.2d 776 (1957), aff'd, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151
N.E.2d 523 (1958), prob. juris. noted, 360 U.S. 246 (1959).
21. DAYTON, 011o, CODE OF CENERAL ORDINANCES § 806-30 (1954). This pro-
vides that the occupant "shall give free access to such dwelling ...at any reasonable
hour for the purpose of inspection."
22. State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St, 123, 138, 151 N.E.2d 523, 532
(1958), affirming 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 N.E.2d 776 (1957).
23. 62 A.2d 874 (D.C. Munie. App. 1948), rev'd, 85 App. D.C. 242, 178 F.2d
13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
24. This provided in § 10 that: "The Health Officer shall examine or cause to be
examined any building supposed or reported to be in an unsanitary condition."
25. District of Columbia v. Little, 85 App. D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13 (1).C. Cir.
1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
26. Id. at 254, 178 F.2d at 25. Also note that while the Little decision was
specifically mentioned in the Ohio, South Carolina, and Maryland cases, all these courts
chose to follow the reasoning of Judge Holtzoff's dissent.
27. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
28. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals on the basis that the defendant's actions did not constitute "interference" with
the performance of the inspector's duties.
29. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Alma Motor Co. v.
Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129 (1946); tlayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
409 (1792).
30. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S, 1 (1950),
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other case denying such a search is the recent decision in St. Louis v.
Claspil 1 The city court held that a search by a building inspector was
unreasonable because attempted at night, in the absence of an emergency,
and for the enforcement of a minor regulation. While this case may be
factually distinguishable from the Little case because attempted "at night,"
the court additionally held that the city did not have the right to inspect
any and all premises at will.
Thus, in the instant case, the Supreme Court faced the problem it
had avoided in 1950, and held that a reasonable administrative search
conducted under the state police powers did not run contrary to fourteenth
amendment due process. The majority -2 justified its holding on what
appears to be three separate bases. First, they traced the historical back-
ground of the fourth amendment from the English case of Entick v.
Carringtonaa to the present day. In doing this they concluded that it was
"the right to be secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions or for forfeitures"3 4 that the fourth amendment was adopted
to protect. Then the Court reasoned that since no evidence for criminal
prosecutions was sought here,35 the protection of this constitutional right,
admittedly secured through the fourteenth amendment, 6 could not be
invoked. However, the Court's very next sentence turned this entire
historical tracing into dictum, by admitting that "the extent to which
the essential right of privacy is protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is of course not restricted within these historic
bounds." 37 As its second, and likewise weak basis, the Court made a
cursory reference to a justification founded upon the prevention and
abatement of nuisances by public authorities. Yet, the Court refused to
put any reliance on prior decisions which have recognized the right of
local or state authorities to summarily abate nuisances without a prior
judicial proceeding and hearing.," Rather it leaves to inference whether
this case was, in fact, based in any part upon this power of the state
31. Unreported, City Court of St. Louis, First Division, April 29, 1959.
32. The decision in the instant case was the weakest possible in constitutional law,
being a 4-1-4 decision. 'I'he majority consisted of Justices Frankfurter, Stewart, Iarlan,
and Clark, with a concurrence by Justice Vhittaker, The dissent was written by justice
Douglas and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Brennan.
33. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
34. 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
35. However, the majority admits that under the Code, the "failure to remove
these hazards to community health gives rise to criminal prosecution." Therefore it
would seem that evidence in such criminal prosecution would have to be obtained in
a separate search conducted with a search warrant, rather than in the search the
instant case allows.
36. Cases cited note 4 supra.
37. Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959).
38. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); State Plant Board v. Smith, 110 So.2d 401 (Fla.
1959); Dedrick v. Smith, 88 N.A. 63, 184 AtI. 595 (1936), appeal dismissed. 299 U.S.
506 (1936); Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 SE.2d 141
(1920).
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to abate nuisances. The final justification for allowing the search is perhaps
the most tenable of the three advanced. It is founded upon the basic
constitutional principle that the fourth amendment does allow the con-
ducting of reasonable searches. In concluding that the search was reasonable,
the Court made reference to: (1) the daylight aspect of the search as
opposed to a "midnight knock on the door,"391 (2) the 200-year precedent
in the State of Maryland for the conducting of such searches, (3) the
great need for protective actions such as systematic area-by-area searches,
and (4) the fact that the power of inspection in the instant case is strictly
limited by the exacting code provisions. In contrast, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Douglas took to task the majority's historical analysis of the
fourth amendment and sought to refute the dictum that this amendment
was limited in scope to criminal and penal actions. The remainder of
the dissent was an adaptation of the reasoning in the Little"' case, empha-
sizing the need for a search warrant in such inspections, and warning of
the infringement on civil liberties.4"
Obviously, in reaching this decision the Court ignored all of the
previously mentioned state decisions.42 However, despite this, the Frank
decision43 has secured, for the present,44 the proposition that reasonable
administrative searches can be conducted without a search warrant. The
holding that such inspections could be constitutionally conducted in the
absence of a warrant lends support and credence to the like opinions
of the state tribunals. The reasoning of Judge Prettyman in the Little
case415 has been in effect impliedly overruled by the majority opinion,
despite the tenacious attempt of Mr. Justice Douglas to keep it alive.
The demise of this line of reasoning leaves the law in this narrow, but
important area, clear and unencumbered. The only other case reaching
a contrary conclusion, St. Louis v. Claspil,46 is easily distinguished from
the instant case because of its "midnight knock" and low position in
39. Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959).
40. Sec the opinion of Judge Prettyman in District of Columbia v. Little, 85 App.
D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
41. It was further contended that since out of the thousands of inspections each
year (36,119 in 1958) only an average of one prosecution was conducted, the rest sub-
mitting voluntarily, the need was not great enough to counterbalance the loss of personal
rights. Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 n. 16 (1959).
42. Givner v. State of Maryland, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956), was
mentioned in Footnote 8 of the majority opinion, but only for the proposition that
Article 26 of the Maryland Constitution is "in pari materia" with the Fourth Amendment.
43. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
44. It is interesting to note that the Court has noted probable jurisdiction of State
ex rel. Eaton v. Price in 360 U.S. 246 (1959), only two weeks after the Frank decision.
However Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker were so strenuously opposed
to this quick reconsideration that they wrote an opinion against it, which is very unusual
in constitutional history. Since Mr. Justice Stewart will not hear the case, as his
father is currently serving on the Ohio Supreme Court, this leaves a 4-4 split, which
will not alter the current decision.
45. 85 App. D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339
U.S. 1 (1950).
46. Un1reported, City Court of St. Louis, First Division, April 29, 1959.
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the judicial hierarchy, being the decision of a municipal court. Thus, in
the remaining 33 cities whose health codes empower entrance without a
warrant to inspect for violations,4 7 it seems well settled that as long as
the actions of the inspector are "reasonable" within themselves, they
will be allowed. Any future denial of such a right to inspection under
the state police power would have to be based upon the unreasonable
actions of the inspecting officer while operating under the provisions of
the various ordinances.
The problem of keeping large cities and their inhabitants free from
disease and epidemic is indeed a serious task facing all municipal govern-
ments. Under the authority of the decisioni in the instant case, that task
has been considerably eased and the way facilitated for the institution of
practical inspection machinery to aid health officials." The Court went to
great lengths in this opinion to keep its holding as narrow as possible
and yet still effectively support its conclusion with the law. The sometimes
entangled and perhaps seemingly superfluous decision rendered by the
majority may well be criticized by some for its lack of clarity, yet it
cannot be denied that the Court has accomplished its goal effectively.
With a minimum loss of personal rights, those being the rights to absolute
inviolability of a man's "castle," the Court has precariously tightroped
the fine lines of search and seizure and due process, and still reaches a
reasonable result. Cities need the unencumbered right to make inspections
for the purpose of discovering substandard health conditions, and this
case has rightly granted it to them.
SAMUEL S. SMnTH
EVIDENCE -AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS AND
THE "DEAD MAN'S STATUTE"
Plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries suffered in an automobile
collision in which he was the sole survivor. The trial court construed the
"Dead Man's Statute" to prohibit the plaintiff from testifying as to the
facts of the accident and directed a verdict for the defendant-executor.
Held, reversed: an automobile accident is not a "transaction" within the
47. The health codes of 57 cities were studied by the Urban Renewal Admin-
istration and out of these, 36 empowered officers to inspect without a warrant. See 3
URBAN RENEWAL BuL.L. (1956).
48. It has been argued that rather than allow these warrantless searches, a special
type of warrant should be provided for. However as recognized by Mr. justice Frank-
ftrrter, to set tip "a loose basis for granting a search warrant for the situation before
us is to enter by way of the back door to a recognition of the fact that by reason of
its intrinsic elements . . . such a search . . . does not offend the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,373 (1959).
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